Abstract The Turkish healthcare system has been subject to major reforms since 2003. During the reform process, access to public healthcare providers was eased and private providers were included in the insurance package for public insurees. This study analyzes data on out-of-pocket (OOP) healthcare expenditures to look into the impact of reforms on the size of OOP health expenditures for premium-based public insurees. The study uses Household Budget Surveys that provide a range of individual-and household-level data as well as healthcare expenditures for the years 2003, before the reforms, and 2006, after the reforms. Results show that with the reforms ratio of households with non-zero OOP expenditure has increased. Share and level of OOP expenditures have decreased. The impact varies across income levels. A semi-parametric analysis shows that wealthier individuals benefited more in terms of the decrease in OOP health expenditures.
Introduction
The Turkish healthcare system is in the process of a major transformation aiming to ease access and to increase efficiency. One aspect of the reform is the rearrangement of the public health insurance schemes. In Turkey, premiumbased public insurance covers about two-thirds of the population. 1 Until 2004, there existed a system with varying benefits for insurees in terms of coverage and provision of health care. Access was restricted to hospitals operated by Ministry of Health (MoH) for some insurees and to relatively small number of hospitals operated by Social Insurance Institution (SII) for others. While private hospitals existed, they were not covered under public insurance, and patients covered by social security had to pay full charge for healthcare services by private providers. Public services were considered to be unsatisfactory due to long waiting times, a shortage of physicians, and lack of high-tech devices. It was very common to use private resources or a mixture of private and public resources. In turn, dual practice in which physicians working in public hospitals also see patients in their private clinics was also very common. When patients chose to use public providers, where most inpatient and outpatient care were covered, it was routine to make informal payments.
During the reform process, benefit packages across different public health insurance schemes were equalized allowing easier access to public hospitals for a large group of public insurees. Moreover, private providers were included in the benefit package. In the meantime, measures to improve efficiency of public hospitals took place. 2 Change in public health insurance was part of a reform in social welfare system aiming to unify the segmented and B. Erus (&) Á N. Aktakke Economics Department, Bogazici University, Bebek, Istanbul, Turkey e-mail: burcay.erus@boun.edu.tr hierarchical system of earlier times. During the process, use of private sector was promoted especially in the provision of healthcare services (see [2] [3] [4] for a discussion of the reforms in general and [5] for a study by World Bank and OECD on reforms in health).
Health insurance aims to decrease the financial burden created by adverse health conditions, and hence reforms that provided better coverage would be expected to decrease OOP expenditures. Wagstaff et al. [6] , however, found that under certain conditions, such as a weak monitoring of providers and partial coverage of health expenditures, demand inducement may take over and result in even higher OOP expenditures. Considering the existence of co-payments, informal payments, and adverse incentive schemes to providers, we should expect a similar upward pressure on OOP expenditures in Turkey's case. Indeed, according to official statistics, during the years 2003-2007, OOP health expenditures increased from 18.5 to 21.7% of total health expenditures in Turkey. This paper analyzes micro data to better understand the change in OOP health expenditures by public insurees.
A number of studies analyzed reform movements in public health insurance programs and the impact of its coverage on OOP expenditures (e.g., [7] [8] [9] or [10, 11] for earlier reforms in Eastern Europe). Closest to our study in methodological terms, Alan et al. [12] made an assessment of the welfare implications of drug subsidies in Canada and found higher benefits for wealthier patients, concluding that an equivalent cash transfer would be more equitable. We also use similar tools and inquire into the impact of the reforms across income levels.
While Turkey launched the reform program in 2003 with various important and interesting aspects, evaluation of these reforms has been rather scarce, mostly due to lack of useful data. On OOP expenditures, there have been some attempts to analyze the situation, mostly with respect to the poor. Aran and Hentschel [1] analyzed the situation of poor between 2003 and 2006. Sulku and Bernard [13] looked into the situation of non-elderly people in 2003 to provide a base point for further studies. Akbulut et al. [14] provide a general review of health insurance reform and discuss the reform in light of earlier examples of international health reforms.
This analysis is based on Household Budget Survey of Turkey (Hanehalkı Bütçe Anketi) [15] for the years 2003 and 2006. Data provide information on the monthly total OOP expenditures on health care as well as its components, total monthly expenditures and type of health insurance. We also have a range of socio-economic indicators that can be used as control variables. We first look into change in presence of any OOP health expenditures and find a significant increase in the number of insurees with non-zero OOP. We then compare the level and share of expenditures on health care before and after the reforms. The share of healthcare-related expenditures in all expenditures seems to be lower on average after the reform. Analysis is also repeated using semi-parametric estimation methods that provide the change in the impact with income level. We find an increase in OOP for very poor households and benefits to increase with income level.
We next provide a brief overview of the Turkish healthcare system and its recent reforms. Then, we discuss the impact of reform on OOP expenditures in Sect. 3. Section 4 presents the data and methodology. Results are discussed in Sect. 5. Section 6 concludes.
Turkish healthcare system and reforms
In Turkey, health care is financed by government funds, a unified social security mechanism, and private payments (mostly directly or through private voluntary health insurance schemes that cover only 1% of the population). Total health expenditure was 5.3 and 5.8% of the GDP in 2003 and 2006, respectively.
Prior to 2008, there were three social security institutions. Retired civil servants were covered by the Government Employees Retirement Fund (GERF). Active civil servants' healthcare services were paid for by their organizations through the government budget, and they were subject to similar rules as GERF members. Private sector employees in formal sector and blue-collar public workers were covered by the Social Insurance Institution (SII), while the self-employed including those working in agricultural sector were covered by Bag-Kur (BK). 3 There also existed a plan for those who are poor and are unable to pay for health care (''Green Card'' 4 ). Bugra and Keyder [2] describe the situation in 2003 as a corporatist social security arrangement where benefits are based on hierarchical status of the beneficiary. Unemployed and informally employed were out of the public health insurance coverage. Among the public insurees, there were clear distinctions. GERF members and active civil servants, the most privileged group, had access to hospitals operated by MoH. SII members were restricted to the relatively small number of hospitals operated by the organization. Unlike GERF members, they were required to use pharmacies operated by these hospitals for drugs. BK members could use MoH hospitals but had restricted access. Relevant public hospitals were free of charge under all three types of social security, but the quality of care at these hospitals was often criticized as being low and particularly in SII hospitals. As primary care services were unsatisfactory and the referral system did not function well (a problem that still persists), patients often went directly to outpatient clinics attached to these hospitals. This led to long waiting times in order to see a doctor [16] . High patient demand also means that doctors may have a tendency to spend little time with each patient. Anecdotal observations and results of diagnostic surveys indicate that in order to secure favorable treatment and better care and services in public hospitals, making out-of-pocket payments, giving presents to doctors and/or hospital personnel, or using connections are common [17] .
Since 2003, efforts have been made to unify the three different insurance schemes. While the unification was formally achieved in 2008, starting in 2004, efforts were put forth to make the coverage of the schemes the same. Starting from mid-2003, the largest group of public insurees (SII members) who have been restricted to hospitals operated by SII, gradually gained right of access to hospitals operated by Ministry of Health (MoH). Starting in 2004, the social security organizations have signed contracts with private hospitals allowing their members to use services offered by those hospitals. Since the amount paid by the social security organizations covered only a portion of the expenses for most medical procedures, private hospitals generally charged extra fees. During the same time period, hospitals operated by MoH started a performance payment system similar to fee-for-service schemes for physicians. This increased the quantity of services provided by hospitals. In 2005, SII stopped operating its own hospitals and transferred their ownership to the MoH. 5 These changes were part of a reform process in the Turkish social welfare system. They were initiated with the support of World Bank that provided both know-how and funding. Reform had three major dimensions. First, it aimed universal coverage, which was partially accomplished in practice. Equalization of benefits across different public insurance programs and extension of the program providing health insurance for the poor were major accomplishments. There still is a relatively large part of population, however, with no insurance coverage. Second, it encouraged the private sector in provisioning of health care. Private hospitals that were out of the benefit package until 2004 have been included since then. This led to a considerable increase in the number of private hospitals and public expenditures into private providers [18] . There are also plans to transform public hospitals into profitoriented bodies where current management composed of physicians will be replaced by professional management. Third, reform has also aimed to increase ''efficiency'' of the healthcare system (promotion of private providers may also be seen in that respect). For that end, it changed fundamentally the way that physicians in public sector are paid. A salary-based payment system was replaced by a fee-for-service system. To face the increasing demand for physician services in public hospitals, it also finished earlier part-time public service system and required physicians to make a choice between private and public sectors.
Major opposition to reforms came from physician organizations. Arguing that the reform policies are part of a neo-liberal economic policy where private sector gradually replaces the public sector, Turkish Medical Association (Türk Tabipler Birligi) opposed the reforms. They argued against MoH distancing itself from the provision of healthcare services. Labor unions have also opposed the reforms in the initial phase when SII hospitals were transferred to MoH, but this opposition proved short as the benefit package of workers was improved (Agartan [4] provides a thorough analysis of the political process as well as the history of reforms).
Reform process is still ongoing. While the three public programs are combined under one roof, it still lacks behind in incorporating the unemployed or informally employed into the system. Privatization process of hospitals is moving slowly and still has not been accomplished. It should be noted that following the general elections in June 2011 reform process may speed up once more.
Reforms and out-of-pocket payments
Impact of the reforms may have worked through different channels, and accordingly OOP expenditures may have changed in different ways. In a system that fully covers both inpatient and outpatient services, increase in the number of hospitals covered under insurance schemes should have led to smaller OOP for insurees.
In Turkey, even under full coverage patients had some expenses. A survey by Tatar et al. [19] found that of all OOP expenditures about 70% of the payments are formal and the rest are informal. For public insurees, drug expenditures constitute half of formal spending followed by payments for hospital and physician services. Drug expenses required a co-payment of 20% for active premium payers and 10% for their dependents and retirees before and after the reforms.
Use of private facilities required substantial charges prior to reforms since these were not covered by the insurance. After 2004, a large number of private providers were included in the public insurance coverage. Private providers had the right to charge the insurees an amount up to 30% of payment by government. Anecdotal evidence suggests even higher charges by private providers but these are still smaller than the charges prior to 2004. 6 It should also be noted that not all the private hospitals signed contracts with the public insurance system. Also, physicians that operated their own private offices were not included under the public insurance coverage.
Third important item of OOP expenditures is informal payments, which were rather common before and possibly after the reforms. Among informal payments, medical expenditures for physicians played the most important role. These payments may have decreased with the reforms easing access to services.
In this setting, there are various channels through which reform may have an impact on OOP expenditures. Increased coverage may have reduced the need for use of private providers not covered under the insurance scheme. Some of informal payments to ease access may have decreased with a larger set of hospitals available to insurees. These are likely to decrease the OOP expenditures.
On the other hand since access costs went down and made healthcare services more affordable, we expect to observe a higher number of households using healthcare services. This could be translated in higher proportion of households with non-zero OOP expenditures, if the use is accompanied with a prescription drug or some extra charges by private or public provider (informally for the public provider). Moreover, lacking proper monitoring, private providers may have incentives to induce demand. This may even be the case in public hospitals because of new payment schemes that are similar to fee-for-service, which create an attractive environment for such behavior. These would increase both the number of households with nonzero OOP and the level of health-related expenditures. Unfortunately, our data only allows us to view the aggregate effects of lower access costs and demand inducement.
The impact is expected to differ across income levels. For wealthier patients who used private providers prior to reform, the cost of private option should have gone down with reforms where social security pays at least part of the costs. Moreover, with reform, the public option worked more efficiently and became a viable option for them. At lower income levels, however, private providers are still likely to be unaffordable due to extra charges. In this setting, we expect the benefits in terms of OOP expenditures to be higher for wealthier households.
Finally, it should be noted that easier access to public and private providers is likely to be beneficial to insurees if the monetary and non-monetary costs of access had been prohibitive. These households may now access treatment, especially for minor items. Unfortunately, we do not have data on the health status and usage of providers to fully assess the non-monetary benefits of easier access.
Methods and data
Turkey does not conduct health surveys regularly. 7 For this study, to compare the situation before and after the reform, we make use Household Budget Survey includes individual and household characteristics, and household expenditures incurred within the month of survey. Out-of-pocket health expenditures used in the study is driven from the survey and takes into account all kinds of health expenditures including co-payments but excluding insurance premiums. Household is the unit used as observation of the health expenditures. HBS also provides information on health insurance status of each individual. The categories are public insurance, private insurance, Green Card, and none. All premium-based public insurance schemes are indicated as public insurance. We classify a particular household as having public insurance if all the household members have public insurance. Those households in which individuals have other or no insurance are kept out of the sample. 8 During this time period, as shown in Table 1 , there was an increase of 3.5 percentage points in the ratio of the households with public health insurance (from 57.2 to 60.7%). If the change is due to the increased benefit package, our results would be subject to selection bias because 7 The closest substitute is Turkish Demographic and Health Survey of 2003 and 2008. The micro data for 2008 were not publicly available yet and does not provide a data set as rich as the Household Budget Surveys. 8 Initially, we tried to use the uninsured as a control group, but their numbers have been halved during this period from 30% of population to 15% (10% point into Green Card holders and 5% points to public insurance) making them difficult to use as controls.
those who are more likely to make use of these new benefits would join the group.
There exist two major reasons for arguing that reforms in health care are not the underlying explanation for the increase in the number of insurees over time. In Turkey, public health insurance and social security (pension system) are bundled in one package. Hence, increasing number of insurees does not reflect only a choice for joining the public health insurance. Moreover, usually, there is no choice left to the individual because unemployment is high, and whether the individual works in a formal job (hence insured) or not is determined by a more complicated process than individual's choice. In that setting, we do not expect the change to be a result from switching the benefit package and health status but from development in socioeconomic variables due especially to rising income levels. Indeed, a probit analysis of the insured vs. uninsured status of the households using a number of socio-economic variables available in the data set (household size, location, some household head characteristics (age, education, marital status), and number of children and elderly in the household) and a dummy for the year 2006 finds the coefficient for the year 2006 dummy to be negative. This suggests that once we control for socio-economic variables there is no increase in the probability of being insured in 2006 compared to 2003 (Appendix Table 4 ).
This constitutes suggestive econometric evidence but not a thorough investigation of the causes for the increase in the number of individuals with social security. Therefore, we also check the robustness of our results regarding OOP expenditures; we repeat all the analysis within a subgroup of our sample, which is not expected to be subject to a change in numbers from 2003 to 2006. This group is composed of retired households. Their decision to be in the social security system cannot be related to the reforms in health insurance, and in both years a similar ratio of households belongs to that group (11.61 and 10.45% of all households in 2003 and 2006, respectively).
To calculate the share of healthcare expenditures in household budget, household income is proxied by monthly expenditure. 9 First, we convert all Turkish lira (TL) values into 2003 prices using general CPI levels for monthly expenditures. Then for healthcare expenditures, we do the adjustment based on subcategories such as prescription drugs and hospitals. and calculate the healthcare expenditures by adding up the adjusted figures of the subcategories. Finally, we calculate the share of healthcare expenditures in total monthly expenditures of a household and use this variable in the analysis.
The survey also provides a range of socio-economic indicators for the household. We use the household size, location (urban or rural), some household head characteristics (age, education, marital status), and number of children and elderly in the household as additional control variables (summary statistics provided in Table 2 ).
Multivariate analysis
Analysis of the presence of any healthcare expenditure with control variables is conducted using probit methodology. The dependent variable is a dummy showing presence of such expenditure. Independent variables include socio-economic variables and a dummy variable for the year 2006, intended to measure the impact of the reforms.
Level and share of health expenditures in total expenditures are analyzed separately. A regression analysis is being used only on households who had non-zero health expenditure during the considered periods. 10 An important question is whether the impact of reforms differs across households according to their income level. We run separate semi-parametric regressions for the years 2003 and 2006 where monthly expenditure is allowed to enter the equation non-parametrically:
In the equation, X denotes other socio-economic variables. Estimated non-parametric function f of monthly expenditures is plotted for share and presence of health expenditures, respectively. Since semi-parametric model is not available within the probit framework, we analyze for a presence of any OOP expenditure using a linear probability model for parametric portion of the estimation. Table 1 displays summary statistics for OOP health expenditures. We find proportion of those with non-zero OOP health expenditures to increase from 41 to 54%. Considering that under the public health insurance insurees are responsible for paying a copayment for drug expenditures, this could be associated with easier access to healthcare services, which may come along with additional expenditures.
Results and discussion
Level of OOP health expenditures increase from 15 TL on average to 23 TL or from 1.6 to 1.9% of total expenditures. This increase may have resulted from the increase in the number of households making use of healthcare services.
Indeed, the average share of health expenditures excluding those households with zero OOP is found to have decreased from 3.8 to 3.5% of all expenditures from 2003 to 2006.
As shown in Table 1 , there is a considerable change in the per capita expenditure levels from 2003 to 2006. The average goes up from about 792 to 1061 TL. The change observed in OOP health expenditures may have resulted from the changes in income and other socio-economic conditions. This motivates a multivariate analysis where the impact of such variables is controlled. Using log of the expenditure as a control variable, we try to control the impact of the income. This strategy is sensible assuming that the impact of the income on health expenditures is similar across individuals and across time periods. The data, unfortunately, does not provide any means to test the validity of this argument, but we are aware of other similar studies, such as Alan et al. [11] , where income levels change considerably over the time periods considered.
The results for the impact of the reforms on public insurees' OOP health expenditures are shown in Table 3 . First set of results present the analysis of having any OOP using probit methodology for public insurees. First line displays the impact of the reforms through a dummy variable for the year 2006. All the numbers are marginal effects and hence show the impact of a change of one unit in relevant variable (a switch from 0 to 1 in case of dummy variables) on the probability of having OOP at the average level of other independent variables.
Before going into the impact of the reforms, we see that independent variables do have expected signs. Higher the household size, the monthly expenditures, number of children and elderly, the higher the probability is for a nonzero OOP. On the contrary, the higher the education level, the lower the probability is, possibly reflecting better health status of educated households.
The marginal effect of the year 2006 dummy is significant at 1% level and is positive. An increase of 6 percentage points is observed in probability of having OOP expenditures in 2006 relative to 2003 for a household with public insurance at the average level of other independent variables. Considering that the ratio of households with non-zero OOP expenditure was 41% in 2003, this implies a sizeable increase of about 15%.
This result may indicate an increase in the use of healthcare facilities. Since drug expenditures carry a copayment, we expect the data to reflect all healthcare visits that include a drug prescription. The observed increase in the ratio of households with positive OOP expenditures may be because of higher usage due to easier access.
The analysis of the share of total expenditures spent on health care is rather difficult considering the change in the proportion of households with OOP expenditure across the years. We follow Alan et al. [11] and consider only those 10 One may alternatively consider a Tobit-like analysis with the whole sample to account for households with no health expenditure. In the absence of variables for health status/needs, this turns out to be futile.
with positive OOP expenditure and run a regression of share of health spending in total spending and the level of health spending. In Table 3 , columns 2 and 3 show that the level and share of OOP health spending seem to be significantly lower for public insurees in 2006 compared to that in 2003. Household size seems to have an unexpected impact on the share of health expenditures, but it should be noted that we do control for the number of children and elderly separately. Furthermore, dropping household size variable from the regression does not change the results significantly (results available from the authors). The analysis is also repeated with a subgroup of the sample households where the main insuree is a retired individual. We find that the results, presented in Table 3 Results are obtained by probit in (1) and (4) and by OLS in others ***, **, * statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively
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This decrease is highest for richer households, increasing quickly above 800 TL expenditure level, constituting approximately top 10% of the distribution. In Fig. 2 , we observe that the change in probability of having non-zero health expenditure from 2003 to 2006 also differs by per capita expenditure level. For those at the bottom, with lower than 200 TL monthly expenditure, we do not observe a significant difference. But the difference increases as expenditures grow and stabilizes at the range of 600-800 TL. The findings indicate that the impact of the reforms have been different for households with various levels of income (as proxied by monthly expenditures per capita of household). At low levels, we observe an increase in the share of health expenditures. This may be related to access to private providers at lower costs. Wagstaff [6] observes a similar trend in China where increasing insurance coverage led to an increase in OOP expenditures. As the income level increases, share of health expenditures decrease at an increasing rate. Access to private providers work in the opposite direction and health expenditures for those who made use of private providers at full cost prior to reforms are smaller with the reform. It should be noted that these arguments are based on results driven from aggregate health expenditures and should be taken cautiously.
Conclusion
Results bring some insight regarding the impact of reforms on OOP health expenditures. Although a higher number of households had non-zero OOP expenditures, the share and level of health expenditures display a decrease over the reform period. With the larger set of benefits, households have to spend less from their pocket compared to earlier periods. As would be expected, the impact on health expenditure is strongest among those with higher income levels. Inclusions of private providers in insurance coverage and lower waiting times at public hospitals are likely to be factors decreasing the costs of wealthier households since they use services of private providers more often.
For households with lower income levels, OOP expenditure has even increased compared to earlier periods. These households were likely to be bearing the non-monetary costs of using free public healthcare services before the reforms. The non-monetary costs could have been lower with the reform, but our data do not allow us to measure the magnitude of the change in non-monetary costs. Various surveys by Turkish Statistics Institute and independent researchers, however, point to a higher level of satisfaction with public providers after the reforms.
Reforms can be considered to be effective in the sense that they increased access to health care by reducing monetary and possibly non-monetary costs of access. Monetary benefits, however, seem to accumulate to wealthier households most likely due to the inclusion of private providers in the system. Our analysis is focused on only one aspect of the reform, OOP health expenditures by premium-based public insurees. A full assessment requires analysis of the impact on health outcomes and impact for other groups, especially for low-income households with no insurance.
It should be noted that similar reforms are prevalent in developing countries. South Asian countries such as South Korea and Taiwan had similar attempts to rearrange the public insurance system. Mexico instituted a reform in 2003 [7] . Findings from Turkish example along with experiences from other countries may provide guidance for other countries contemplating a reform in their health insurance systems.
In that respect, it should be noted that despite the reforms, OOP expenditures continue to exist. This could be related to co-payments and informal payments. Informal payments to physicians and other health providers are a serious problem in Turkey. Our evidence suggests that the issue is even more important for those at the lower income levels. Two policy priorities seem to decrease and even eliminate the co-payments for those at low-income levels and to clear the system from informal payments. Results are obtained by probit in columns (1) and (2) and by OLS in others ***, **, * statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively Impact of Healthcare Reforms 345
